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Small is beautiful? Organizational Identity and  
Growth Rates in a Partitioned Market 
 
 
Abstract 
The present paper aims at contributing to the discussion on the determinants of organizational 
diversity by illustrating the process of identity-based resource partitioning observed in the 
German electricity market after deregulation from 2001 to 2008. We contend that the demise 
of regional utilities contributed to sharpen the identity of municipal utilities as oppositional 
identities to that of nation-wide utilities, ultimately creating durable boundaries among forms. 
Identity-based partitioning however heterogeneously affected the growth of municipal 
utilities due to the substantial differences in terms of strategies and endowments such firms. 
The potential ramifications of peripheral firms’ success on the distinctiveness of their 
collective identity and, thus, for the durability of diversity are discussed. 
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Introduction 
The study of the evolution of organizational diversity is central to a broad range of 
research streams such as industrial organization (Tirole, 1988), strategic management (Porter, 
1980), institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) and organizational ecology (Hannan 
and Freeman, 1977). The scholarly interests in organizational diversity derive from its broad 
implications for individuals, organizations, industries, markets and societies in general. 
Diversity impacts individual career opportunities (Hannan, 1988), stimulates entrepreneurial 
activities (Greve, Pozner & Rao 2006) and innovation (Bain, 1956; Scherer, 1980), influences 
industrial evolution and market structures (Carroll, 1985), and impinges on the production of 
culture (Peterson and Berger, 1975) and collective actions aiming at societal changes (Olzak 
and Ryo, 2007).  
Resource partitioning theory (Carroll, 1985) is a theory fragment within organization 
ecology directly concerned with the emergence of organizational diversity. This theory 
argues that the competitive process dictated by economies of scale drives smaller generalists 
out of the market. The few survivors grow larger and eventually come to dominate the 
market, increasing market concentration. As covering the whole market range is not in line 
with the strategies of these firms, peripheral demand is left unsatisfied. A different type of 
firm – i.e., specialists -- emerge to target this unmet demand. Empirical support for resource 
partitioning has been obtained from a wide variety of industries such as telephone, 
cooperative banking, airline, beer brewing, wine making, newspaper, auditing and car 
manufacturing (for a review see Carroll, Dobrev & Swaminathan 2002). 
A key assumption of resource partitioning pertains to the equilibrium associated with 
the ensuing segmentation – i.e., to its durability, see Polos, Hannan & Carroll, 2010. This 
view appears at odds with that of other scholars who have argued in favor of cyclical 
processes of market concentration and diversity (e.g., Peterson and Berger 1975). We aim at 
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contributing to this stream of research by discussing the forces that may challenge or, 
conversely, prolong the durability of resource partitioning within a market. In particular, our 
arguments will center on: (i) how oppositional identities contribute to organizational diversity 
through the creation of durable boundaries among forms (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000); 
and (ii) how identity based partitioning may heterogeneously affect peripheral organizations 
due to substantial differences across such firms in terms of strategies and endowments. 
Eventually, the enduring success of peripheral firms may contribute to challenge the 
coherence of their collective identity and to blur its distinctiveness with respect to market 
leaders. 
To reach these goals, we will rely on two recent developments of resource 
partitioning. First, empirical evidence (Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000) suggests that identity 
differences – rather than scope diseconomies as originally argued (Carroll, 1985) -- are 
fundamental to the durability of resource partitioning. Indeed, in the US brewery movement, 
the success of specialist breweries did not rely on a different quality of the output. What 
mattered was the difference in the identity of the producers which sustained the emergence of 
market partitioning. Second, recent theoretical developments emphasized competitive release 
as the critical trigger of partitioning and distinguished three producer segments: center, near-
center (those that by failing contribute to release resources) and peripheral producers (Hannan 
et al., 2007; Polos, Hannan & Carroll, 2010).  
The goal of this paper is therefore twofold. First, we aim at providing evidence about 
the theoretical mechanism of competitive release and to illustrate the larger benefits gathered 
by peripheral organizations compared to local subsidiaries of center organizations. Second, 
we wish to move beyond the average beneficial effect of partitioning on peripheral 
organizations and to illustrate the substantial differences among peripheral organizations in 
terms of identity claims and identity matching. The constructs of engagement and intrinsic 
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appeal (see Hannan et al., 2007) will be employed to capture such differences. As identities 
of peripheral producers are often rooted into size differences compared to market leaders, we 
will focus on firm growth rates. Because a mixed method -- i.e., qualitative and quantitative -
- is employed to explore our research questions, the next section is meant to introduce the 
reader to the empirical context under investigation. 
The Empirical Setting 
The German electricity retail market after deregulation offers an excellent context to 
study the effects of competitive release and organizational identities on market partitioning. 
Being a commodity market, product differentiation is minimal as compared with consumer 
product markets such as beer or wine. The empirical counterpart of specialist (i.e., peripheral) 
organizations are municipal utilities (thereafter MUs). As the collective identity of MUs is a 
driving force of partitioning after deregulation, we first provide information about its origins. 
MUs in Germany have a long history. Since the late 19th century’s urbanization of the 
German cities, prompted by the concerns for their residents’ wellbeing, the local authorities 
started to provide gas, electricity and water supply as well as services in sewage, waste 
removal and public transport through the local MUs. By providing these services, local 
authorities acted in the interests of "the common good of the local community" (Wollmann, 
2002). The surpluses generated by the profitable parts of the MUs like electricity, gas and 
water supply, were used to cross-subsidize the deficit parts like public transport and sport 
facilities (Wollman, 2002; Püttner, 1999: 543). The generated profits enable local authorities 
to pay for common interest activities such as maintaining kindergartens, schools and streets.  
Before the deregulation, around 900 electricity suppliers served German end 
customers including industrial, commercial and household customers in their respective 
monopoly regions (Die Welt, 1998). In 1997, eight utilities (the “Big Eight”) operated at the 
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supra-regional level and around 80 companies operated at the regional level. According to 
VDEW (renamed to BDEW since 2007), the German Association of Energy and Water 
Industries, in 1998 more than 700 MUs served end consumers in their municipalities with 
electricity
1
. In 1996, EU introduced the Electricity Directive aiming to build an internal 
electricity market. Following this directive, the member states started to deregulate their 
national electricity markets within the next 2 years. Germany opened its electricity market to 
100% competition at once in 1998, meaning that all end customers could purchase electricity 
from any supplier in the market. 
Before the deregulation started, many experts had expected high mortality rates 
among the MUs because electricity market is a market of homogeneous good with strong 
economies of scale (Die Welt, 1998; 1999). Since 1998, the market concentration increased 
considerably (German Monopoly Commission, 2007) as a result of the following processes. 
From 1998 to 2002, the “Big Eight” merged to “Big Four”(E.ON, RWE, EnBW and 
Vattenfall Europe) and their operations spread nationwide (thereafter NWUs). The growth of 
market center organizations came at the expenses of regional utilities. Out of the 80 regional 
utilities existed in 1998, more than half have been either totally absorbed or partially 
controlled by NWUs. The expected wide death of the MUs however did not take place (Die 
Welt, 2010). The aggregated market share of MUs in retailing actually increased from about 
33% in 1997 to roughly 40% in 2006 (VKU, 2007). Contrary to the considerable customer 
loss that the NWUs suffered (Die Welt, 2008), the MUs enjoy a good image, and the trust and 
loyalty of their customers (Die Welt, 2009). The renaissance of the MUs is also discussed in 
the mass media (e.g. Financial Times Deutschland, 2008; Frankfurter Rundschau, 2009; Die 
Tageszeitung, 2010).  
                                                          
1
 Besides the cross-regional, regional utilities and MUs, the population of electricity suppliers includes also a 
small number of cooperatives and private firms, usually of small size. 
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Theory and Hypotheses 
In developing our hypotheses, along with the theoretical arguments we will make use 
of the qualitative data obtained from four main sources. (i) Reports based on TNS Emnid 
survey (1999; 2003; 2005; 2009): the telephone surveys have been funded by VKU (the trade 
association for MUs) and carried out by TNS Emnid Market Research. The sample size for 
the year 1999, 2003 and 2005 is 500, for 2009 is 1000. (ii) Reports based on ifm study 
(2006): this study has been funded by the umbrella trade association BDEW (German 
Association of Energy and Water Industries) and conducted by ifm market research institute. 
The study consists of 60 in-depth interviews with household customers each lasting 1.5 to 2 
hours, carried out by professional psychologists. (iii) Reports based on BDEW customer 
surveys (BDEW household customer survey, 1999-2009; BDEW commercial customer 
survey 2000-2009): funded by BDEW and conducted by PROMIT Institut fuer Prognose, 
Marktforschung & Informationstechniken with a sample size of 1200 household customers 
and 1040 commercial customers from 13 business areas. (iv) 11 semi-structured in-depth 
interviews we have conducted between 2008 and 2010, each lasting 1 to 2 hours. The 
interviewees include 6 MU managers and department chiefs, the chief of market data 
department of BDEW and the deputy executive of VKU. Three informant have been 
interviewed twice. In addition, we carried out a considerable number of unstructured 
interviews at industrial conferences or via telephone as well as extensive research of the 
German national and local newspapers through LexisNexis. 
Competitive Release 
 Recent theoretical developments (Hannan et al., 2007; Polos et al., 2010) emphasize 
competitive release as the key trigger of resource partitioning. Competitive release refers to 
the “conditions that deliberate a population of organizations that had effectively precluded the 
emergence and growth of a focal population” (Hannan et al., 2007: 216; Polos et al., 2010). 
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Under scale-based competition, resources are released through the exit of near-center 
producers, which remove a competitive constraint from peripheral organizations. Besides 
freeing resources, the demise of near-center producers contributes to increase the contrast 
between center and peripheral forms (Polos et al., 2010). Two simultaneous forces induce this 
latter effect (see Zerubavel, 1996): the “lumping” of peripheral producers together and the 
“splitting” between center and periphery perceived by audience members. “Lumping” takes 
place when alike organizations cooperate and recognize the existence of a common identity 
in presence of a common enemy or a salient out-group (Hawley, 1986; but see also Pozner 
and Rao, 2006; Ingram and Yue, 2008). As a result of this cooperation among peripheral 
producers, a more coherent and salient peripheral identity emerged. At the same time, the 
“perceived unity” of the population is disrupted by the demise of the near-center producers 
(Hannan et al., 2007: 227) and by the increasing perceived contrast between center and 
peripheral forms.  
Rising contrast between center and periphery tilts the competitive balance toward the 
latter -- i.e., organizations relying on ‘local’ identities (Hannan, 1979; Hannan et al., 2007). 
The essence of a durable resource partitioning is now established: peripheral organizations 
exhibit a sharper and increasingly oppositional identity and benefit from renewed attention 
from audience members. Thus we expect that in the context of organizational growth rates, 
peripheral organizations should profit the most from competitive release. Conversely, while 
center producers may expand their aggregate organizational size thanks to potential 
acquisitions, their local subsidiaries on average should benefit less from the competitive 
release – at least when compared to peripheral producers.  
The description of the empirical context of this study made clear that valid 
counterparts of center, near-center and peripheral forms are NWUs, regional utilities and 
MUs. Qualitative evidence in the German electricity industry supports this claim. According 
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to ifm study (ifm 2006), customers perceive the identities of the NWUs and their “own 
municipal utilities” as distinct and oppositional. As illustrated in Figure 1, while the large 
corporations embody the omnipotent, uncontrollable and abstract aspects of electricity, the 
small and medium sized MUs provide to the abstract product of electricity a tangible and 
familiar face, well represented by the drawings of an interviewee in terms of the cosy and 
pleasant everyday life that electricity enables (ifm, 2006).  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Evidence shows that the increasing contrast between NWUs and MUs indeed fuelled 
MUs’ growth. For example, the MU which is owned 100% by the municipality Wedel, 
started to acquire customers actively in nearby Hamburg from April 2007. In Hamburg, the 
energy market was dominated by two of the NWUs’ local subsidiaries: Vattenfall Europe in 
Hamburg- the decedent of the former regional utility HEW and E.ON Hanse- a regional 
branch of E.ON about 20 times as big as the MU Wedel (Zeitung fuer Kommunale 
Wirtschaft, 2007b). With its expansion into the home territories of the NWUs, the MU Wedel 
intended to “declare battle” against the energy giants (vwd Energy Daily 2007). In the 
marketing campaign, MU Wedel emphasizes its image of municipality owned, middle-sized 
company from the neighborhood, independent from the energy giants. This makes the 
municipal utilities for the Hamburger “already sympathetic”, according to the CEO of the 
MU (taz 2007). The MU Wedel matched its image with one of its newly gained customers- 
FC St. Pauli, a local soccer club – i.e., “Just like we as a small local company, the club also 
has to fight with passion and creativity against the big players with a lot money… a David-
against-Goliath-situation”, as the CEO put it. As a part of the campaign, the MU Wedel 
humorously declared the Hamburg city district St Pauli as “30.000 Squaremeter Energy free 
of the Energy Giants” with a symbolic border and a toll keeper (taz 2008). The marketing 
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campaign was a success. More than twice of the expected number of customers in Hamburg 
switched from E.ON Hanse and Vattenfall Europe to MU Wedel. 
Building on the arguments and evidence presented, we propose an hypothesis which 
juxtaposes the growth rates of peripheral and center organizations triggered under 
competitive release. 
Hypothesis 1. The larger the competitive release due to the failure of regional 
utilities, the greater the marginal benefits of MUs compared to the subsidiaries of 
NWUs. 
Beyond Homogeneous Peripheries: Variations of Intrinsic Appeal and Engagement 
In the former section, we followed the spirit of traditional resource partitioning 
studies, which mostly concentrate on prototypical – i.e., average -- peripheral firms. In this 
section we challenge this view and concentrate on peripheral firms, the primary focus of 
resource partitioning. We contend that the MU segment, as much as any specialist segment 
(Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000), exhibits substantial heterogeneity across peripheral firms. 
More specifically, we challenge the average effect of resource partitioning along two 
dimensions: identity matching remains contingent on the fitness (i.e., intrinsic appeal) to 
audience preferences; and the intensity of the engagement with the claimed identity varies 
across firms as well. As for identity matching, the target audience of specialist firms has been 
considered as rather uniform so far (see e.g., Carroll, 1985; Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000). 
We challenge this assumption pointing to the differences in the intrinsic appeal of MUs 
across geographical communities (H2). Moreover, by taking a closer look on firm level 
actions (i.e., engagement), we will reflect upon the effects of engagement on organizational 
viability (H3). Last, we will advance that the co-existence of identity claims and identity 
matching allows peripheral firms taking full advantage of the opportunities generated by the 
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identity-based partitioning (H4).  
Variations in Identity Matching: Intrinsic Appeal 
The matching to audience tastes or characteristics may be defined in terms of intrinsic 
appeal (as inferred from an audience member’s social position, see McPherson 1983). Higher 
intrinsic appeal leads to higher organizational fitness (Hannan et al., 2007; Hannan, 2010) – 
i.e., the matching to a local environment. Fitness refers to “a producer’s ability to thrive 
within its environment – to obtain necessary resources, to persists, and to grow” (Hannan 
2010). Higher intrinsic appeal is essential to reach greater organizational fitness.  
Despite recent theoretical developments, the appreciation of heterogeneity among 
audience preferences remains an important but underdeveloped topic (Hannan et al., 2007; 
Kocak, Hannan & Hsu 2010). Audience preferences can be segmented along multiple 
dimensions. In this paper we use geographical communities as the basis for segmentation. In 
so doing, we rely on Hannan and colleagues’ suggestion (2007: 302) that “a potential 
valuable extension… of audience segment would consider geography. We defined segment as 
subsets of an audience that are largely closed with respect to interaction and communication. 
Such closure often takes a spatial form: social networks tend toward spatial closure. 
Therefore, audience segments likely to form in spatial patches… Perhaps variation over local 
audience segments in the legitimation of categories also plays a role”. These considerations 
resonate with those of sociologists, economic geographers and organizational theorists who 
underscored the role of geographical proximity for the emergence of collective mindsets 
(e.g., Gould 1995; Hedstrom, 1994; Becattini, 1990; Romanelli and Khessina, 2005). 
To properly consider identity matching with respect to intrinsic appeal, the relevant 
dimensions of the MU identity need to be introduced. After deregulation, with the exit of 
regional utilities, audience members started to perceive MUs as possessing opposite feature 
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values compared to NWUs. According to qualitative evidence and to a recent survey (TNS 
Emnid, 2009), localness and environmental friendliness became the two defining features of 
the MU identity. The prominence of these identity features remains consistent across the TNS 
Emnid surveys of 1999, 2003, and 2005. Customers associated MUs with “orientation on the 
common welfare of the local region”, “support for the local region” as well as 
“environmental friendly behavior”. In contrast, the NWUs are described as “profit seeking”, 
“flexibility”, and “customer orientation” (Figure 2). “Supply security” and “reliability” figure 
prominently in audience perception as well. Nonetheless, perceptions of security and 
reliability appear correlated to localness (ifm, 2006).  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Localness appears as the most prominent MU identity feature according to the TNS 
Emnid surveys (1999; 2003; 2005; 2009). As shown in Figure 2, whereas 45% of the 
interviewees expect “orientation on the common welfare of the local region” and “support for 
the local region” from the MUs, only 9% think so of private utilities. This is consistent with 
the results of the ifm psychological survey (ifm, 2006). One of the most important customer 
type identified by this surveys is “local patriots”. This group of customers perceive both 
themselves and the MUs as deeply rooted in the local community. The local MUs belong to 
the taken-for-granted part of one’s living space like the school and bars. In other words, the 
MU is seen as a symbol of the community itself, with which citizens strongly identify. Thus 
they feel being obliged to show solidarity toward their MUs: “I think we in the region should 
hold together.” Alternative offerings from the NWUs are perceived as “assault” from outside 
attacking one’s own living space and should be fended off. It is therefore not surprising that 
attempts to privatize MUs are compared with “selling off family jewelry” (Tafelsilber in 
German) and have sparked off citizen referendums or even demonstrations in  various 
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communities (e.g. Energie & Management, 2001; Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2008). Local pride 
also leads the local patriots to attach emotion to electricity, like a customer of the MU 
Dresden proudly declared: “this is Dresdener electricity” (ifm, 2006). An energy expert 
confirmed “the idea of ‘we from here’ is very powerful” and associated this with the 
comparably low switching rate of MU customers (Die Welt, 2010). Due to the strong 
attachment to their MUs, the local patriots tend to disregard market information. They show 
no interests in alternative offerings and appear as hardly price sensitive: they are willing to 
pay a bit more for the “local” electricity2, and tolerant toward price differences (ifm, 2006).  
Environmental friendliness is the second pivotal feature of the MU identity. Whereas 
35% of the consumers associate environmental friendliness with MUs, merely 8% think so in 
relation to NWUs and other private utilities. The early years of the BDEW household and 
commercial customer surveys pointed out that both NWUs and MUs show image deficit with 
respect to environment relevant aspects” and urges its members to take measures (e.g. BDEW 
household customer survey, 1999; BDEW commercial customer survey, 2000). MUs 
provided energy saving tips in the own customer magazine, building photovoltaic arrays on 
the roof of the local kindergarten and constructing environmental friendly combined heat and 
power (CHP) generation capacity. In contrast, even when actively portraying themselves as 
environmental friendly (e.g. Die Welt, 2001), NWUs turned out to be unsuccessful. The 
factual high percentage of electricity generated by their coal plants and especially nuclear 
power plants have made their claims anything but authentic and the NWUs are duly called 
“nuclear utilities” (e.g. Der Spiegel, 2002; Financial Times Deutschland, 2010).  
                                                          
2
On a technical standpoint it is impossible to tell whether the electricity one buys is local or not. One 
interviewee illustrates in the following way: imagine there are 5 rivers flowing into a lake. You take one glass of 
water from the lake and it is impossible to say that it is from river A. According to the ifm survey (2006), this 
seems to be well known among the customers being aware that “electricity is electricity” and the NWUs 
generate a majority of the German electricity anyway. However, the psychological effects of “local electricity” 
which is actually only distributed by the local MUs persists. This is similar to the phenomenon that people pay 
premium prices for “green” electricity. 
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While localness and greenness represent identity features common to every MU, the 
context within which each MU is located provides variations in matching between these 
identity dimensions and the preferences of local customers. In particular, we suggest that the 
growth rates of MUs should be higher in communities in which the intrinsic appeal of the 
MU identity is greater. In particular, the more a community espouses localness and 
greenness, the larger the growth rates of MUs: 
H2. (Intrinsic Appeal) Under resource partitioning, the greater the MU identity 
appeals to the local audience (i.e., the greater the match between the two MU identity 
features and local audience preferences), the higher its growth rate will be. 
Variations in Identity Claims: Engagement 
Peripheral organizations vary also along the intensity of the identity claims made (see 
Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000). Indeed, peripheral organizations differ in their degree of 
engagement – a fundamental characteristic to convert intrinsic appeal into fitness, namely 
growth rates in our case. Engagement refers to producer actions like “(1) learning about the 
idiosyncrasies of the local subaudience and its aesthetics; (2) designing or redesigning 
features of the offering to make it attractive to that audience; and (3) trying to establish a 
favourable identity in the relevant subaudience” (Hannan et al., 2007: 179). Engagement 
activities aimed at developing and displaying credible signals of authenticity and 
commitments towards the claimed identities are especially rewarded (see Carroll and 
Swaminathan, 2000; Baron, 2004; Hsu and Hannan, 2005; Hannan et al., 2007). For instance, 
in their study on the American microbrewery movement, Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) 
found that brewpubs send strong signals of authenticity and demonstrate high engagement 
with audience members by displaying their production equipment in the store-front locations.  
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In our setting, one way to engage with local audience and to show commitment 
towards the claimed identity is to participate in cooperation activities with other MUs. As 
market concentration increased, the Big Four emerges as the prominent enemies and 
substantial threat to the MUs. In an industry where economics of scale play a crucial role for 
organizational survival, it is difficult for the small and medium-sized MUs to survive on their 
own. Thus many experts have predicted a wide death of the MUs (Die Welt, 1998; 1999). 
Due to their prominent position in the retail market, NWUs have attempted to lure the MUs 
to “cooperate” with them. However, many municipal utilities feared such an alliance as a 
threat to their identity. To the contrary, they preferred to emphasize that they are endowed 
with “a fundamentally different organizational philosophy and mission” – as stated by the 
chairman of the VKU (the German MU trade association) group of the Land Rheinland-Pfalz 
(Zeitung fuer Kommunale Wirtschaft  2007a). As a results, MUs preferred to cooperate with 
each other. 
Cooperation among MUs not only suggests an authentic commitment to the MU 
identity, it also serves to increase the salience and uniqueness of the MU identity. These 
cooperation activities were rooted in the identity of MUs as municipal enterprises and into 
their care for their local communities. Cooperation is “to achieve critical size among the like-
minded ”, as the executive chief of Traunstein MU put (Zeitung fuer Kommunale Wirtschaft  
2006a). As the MUs in Krefeld and in Neuss planned their cooperation with each other, their 
stated goal was “ensuring and extending their market position in the region and the 
maintenance of a customer-near, municipal oriented energy supply” (Energie & Management 
2006). The mission of the MUs and the municipal cooperation groups is “the development of 
the local economic and living environment for a strong and worth-living region… 
strengthening the economic independent future of the municipal companies in a changing 
energy market”, according to the mission statement of KOS- a cooperation group of 14 
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municipal utilities from Upper Bavaria and Swabia (KOS Web page). The municipal 
cooperation groups see in themselves “Robin Hood against the Big Four” (Zeitung fuer 
Kommunale Wirtschaft  2006b). Another example is the MU cooperation SüdWestStrom. 
Over 60 regional MUs declared their areas as “EnBW (one of the Big Four)-free” zone and 
formed the cooperation group to support each other to remain competitive and independent of 
NWUs (Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2008). The members of the cooperation group supported local 
communities through sponsoring local events, engaging in collective campaigns that 
highlighted their care for local citizens, and more importantly, allowed building 
environmental-friendly power generation capacity (SüdWestStrom web page). Compared to 
MU’s well received local engagements, NWU’s efforts appeared unconvincing. For example, 
EnBW conducted a campaign in the local press of Baden-Württemberg claiming their local 
and environmental friendly investments. The director of MU Tübingen publicly labelled this 
effort as unauthentic: “we pay dividend in Tübingen and not in Paris”, pointing to EnBW’s 
shareholder- the French nuclear giant EdF (Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2008). 
Building on these arguments, we advance that substantial differences among 
peripheral firms may exist in terms of the intensity and credibility of their engagement with 
the claimed identity. In particular, we propose that the higher the level of commitment 
exhibited by the focal MU to the identity claimed, the greater its growth rate will be: 
Hypothesis 3 (Engagement). Under resource partitioning, the higher the lever of a 
MU’s engagement, the higher its growth rate will be. 
Interaction between Intrinsic Appeal and Engagement 
 While the credibility of an MU identity claim and its matching to local preferences 
may act independently in increasing the growth rates of MUs (see H2 and H3), it seems 
intuitive to think that the co-existence of these two conditions further amplifies the benefits 
gathered by MUs. Indeed, according to the model of Hannan and his colleagues (2007) when 
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both intrinsic appeal and engagement are non-zero, fitness (e.g., growth rates) should be the 
highest. In particular, engagement should play a crucial role in the relationship between 
intrinsic appeal and fitness. In presence of a good match between an organization identity and 
local preferences, engagement will boost fitness. In a similar vein, intrinsic appeal should 
amplify the effect of engagement on fitness. Better fit with local tastes will obviously make a 
credible identity claim appear more authentic and more convincing. To take an extreme case 
as an example, large NWUs invested great effort (and money) to communicate their local 
image to the target audience through massive marketing campaigns. Nonetheless, the lack of 
intrinsic appeal of their identity in the eyes of local audience members reduces significantly 
the returns from fitness. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H4. Under resource partitioning, the positive returns of intrinsic appeal for MU 
growth rates are amplified at higher levels of MU engagement. 
Data and Methods 
Data Source 
 To test our hypotheses, we have collected various datasets. The first data set concerns 
the annual electricity retail sales to household customers from 2001 to 2008.
3
 We chose to 
focus on the household customer segment because we expect the hypothesized effects to be 
stronger among household customers rather than, e.g., large industrial firms. The data were 
primarily obtained from the BDEW annual data publication (BDEW Jahresdaten der 
Stromversorger 2001-2008). As the umbrella trade association for the German electricity and 
                                                          
3
 Covering the industry from 1998 – i.e., the year in which the deregulation started -- is not possible for two 
reasons: first, there existed no data for 1999 and 2000; second, although we have sales data for 1998, the 
categorization of end customers was different. In contrast to the three segments categorization (household, 
industrial and other customers) from 2001, only two segments (customers paying normal tariff rates and 
customers paying non-tariff rates specified in a contract) were distinguished in 1998. Whereas the non-tariff 
customers were dominated by industrial customers consuming large amount of electricity, tariff customers 
include both household customers as well as other customers such as small shops, office spaces etc. 
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water industry, BDEW’s (previously VDEW) members represent over 90% of the electricity 
retail market share (BDEW web page). The final data set therefore consists of 573 MUs and 
15 subsidiaries of NWUs in the German electricity industry, covering about 80% of the entire 
population of NWUs and MUs. 
To measure the matching of the MU identity to local preferences, we collected data 
from the German Federal Statistical Office Web Site about the socio-demographic statistics 
of the 439 counties of Germany. The coverage of the data ranges from 2000 to 2007. As for 
the identity claims of each MU, we obtained information on cooperation activities from the 
data collected by BDEW and VKU. The information gathered from the home pages of MUs 
and from various cooperation groups, as well as from German national and local newspaper 
articles using LexisNexis, served to double-checked and complement the data collected.  
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
 Our dependent variable is organizational growth. We measure Size using the retail 
sales of electricity to households in MWh (megawatt hour). Other common size measures are 
annual revenues and number of employees (e.g., Khaire 2010). Annual revenues from 
electricity retail sales is not feasible here because electricity prices showed great volatility 
over the period under study (Monopoly Commission, 2007). Number of employees turned out 
to be not suitable in our context because the MUs usually have other business areas such as 
gas, water, heating and the allocation of employees to the different business areas is difficult. 
We log-transformed Size to reduce its skewness. 
Independent Variables 
Competitive Release. The variable Competitive Release was calculated as the size 
(sales to end customers) of each failed regional utilities in a given year, weighted by their 
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distance to each of the focal MU or an NWU subsidiary. Due to their exit after deregulation, 
we used the size of failed regional utilities in the year 1998. The distance an MU or a NWU 
subsidiary i to a failed regional utilities j by applying the “Great Circle Distance Formula” : 
 
with r denoting the radius of the earth in kilometres and c being a constant of 180/π which is 
necessary in order to convert latitude or longitude from decimal degrees to radians. The 
latitude and longitude of each firm has been obtained from “Google Map” using the function 
“LatLng Tooltip” in “Maps Labs” (see also Beck et al., 2010). In a second step, we weighted 
the distance with the size of the failed regional utilities to calculate the Competitive Release: 
                     ∑
     
          
 
To test Hypothesis 1 (i.e., MUs exhibit higher growth rates than the subsidiaries of the 
NWUs at higher levels of competitive release), we interacted the Competitive Release 
variable with the dummy MU which is coded as 1 if the focal firm is an MU and 0 if it is a 
subsidiary of the NWUs (CompetitiveReleaseXMU). In the remaining models, Competitive 
Release is entered as a control. The Competitive Release variable was log transformed 
because of its highly skewed distribution. 
Intrinsic Appeal. To test Hypothesis 2, a variable that measures the extent to which 
the feature values of the MU identity are traceable in the local community was needed. 
Remember that localness and environmental friendliness emerged as the two salient identity 
features of MUs. To proxy Localness, we employed the voter turnout in county elections (for 
a discussion see the validity issues section). Regions where people care more about the 
development and well-being of the local community tend to exhibit higher voter turnout. The 
higher the voter turnout, the greater the fit with MU’s localness. Since county elections are 
held every 5 years, we filled the missing years through linear interpolation (see e.g. Boone, 
          clongclongclatclatclatclatrDist
ijjijiij
//cos/cos/cos/sin/sincos
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Declerck, Rao and Van den Buys, 2012; Schneiberg and Bartley, 2001). We measured 
Greenness with the proportion of people in a county voting for the German Green Party in the 
Bundestag (the lower house of the federal parliament) election. Measuring this construct by 
using county elections is not possible as the Green Party does not have a candidate in every 
region. Bundestag elections are held every four years and linear interpolation was used for 
the missing years. It is worth noting the novelty of the measurement applied here. Although 
the recent theorization emphasizes audience perception rather than product (or producer) 
characteristics in determining appeal of an offer (Hannan et al., 2007), most of the existing 
empirical studies still rely on product (or producer) features (e.g. Hsu, 2006; Negro et al., 
2010; Carroll et al., 2010).  
Engagement. Engagement in terms of cooperation activities among MUs took various 
forms (Zeitung fuer Kommunale Wirtschaft , 2001; Energie & Management, 2005; Energie & 
Management, 2008). Shortly after deregulation, most cooperation agreements were inspired 
by economic reasoning such as collective purchasing electricity in order to increase their 
collective bargaining power. This form of cooperation is flexible and loose, as it requires 
little commitment. Cooperation activities of collective purchasing and trading were thus 
labelled Economic Engagement. The second category of cooperation activities took the form 
of collective marketing and sales. These activities represent commitment to the MU identity 
as they present MUs as a collective identity to audience members. We labelled these 
activities as Form Identity Engagement. Before the deregulation, there existed “division of 
labor” among the electricity firms on the national, regional and municipal levels in the (West) 
German electricity industry despite that they all serve end customers in their respective 
monopoly regions. The nationwide firms with large-scale power plants generated electricity 
and sold it to the regional utilities; regional utilities then distributed it to municipal utilities 
which then sell to end customers (FES 1991, Brandt 2006, Krisp 2007). Therefore, MUs had 
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very little generation capacity, and therefore limited independence from the NWUs (Energie 
& Management, 2005; Energie & Management, 2008). To preserve their independence, MUs 
engaged in building collective power plants and started to share the generation capacity. As 
this form of cooperation represents the most genuine commitment to the MU identity, we 
labelled it Local Independence Engagement.  
Building on this categorization, we created the variable Engagement in a way that 
takes a larger value with increasing commitment to the MU identity. In particular, the 
variable takes the value of 1 when the focal MU does not engage in any cooperation activities 
and the value of 2, 3, 4 if it engages in Economic Engagement, Form Identity Engagement 
and Local Independence Engagement, respectively. Our coding is also inspired by the 
developmental stages of each type of cooperation, as discussed by industrial experts (Energie 
& Management, 2005; Energie & Management, 2008). The variable is coded the highest in 
presence of multiple cooperation activities at the same time. For example, if an MU engages 
in both Economic Engagement and Local Independence Engagement in a given year, we 
assign a value 4 to the Engagement variable.
4
 All independent variables were lagged of one 
year to control to avoid reverse causality. 
Control Variables 
Several control variables were included in our models. We control for MU density and 
density squared at the district level
5
 (MU Density, MU Density
2
) as density might be 
negatively linked to firm growth (see Barnett and Carroll, 1987). Furthermore, we controlled 
for population per sqkm (Population Density) because population density tend to increase 
electricity retail sales. More densely populated areas are considered in the industry as “fillet 
pieces” which are more profitable (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 2010). We also controlled for the 
                                                          
4
 The results obtained for each type of cooperation agreement suggest that Economic Engagement and Local 
Independence Engagement exhibit the strongest effects on growth rates. 
5
We also experimented with controlling for density and density squared at the state level obtaining very similar 
results to those discussed below. 
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average Population Age and the average Disposable Income of a county since both factors 
impact electricity demand (see Tonn and Eisenberg, 2006; Hamza and Gilroy, 2011). The 
municipal debt level (Municipal Debt) in the focal area was controlled for as well as the 
amount of Electricity Usage defined in terms of the aggregated electricity usage by all tariff 
customers in Germany in a given year. We log-transformed the control variables except the 
two density ones to reduce the skewness of their distributions. Last, calendar year was added 
to the models to account for temporal variations in demand. Table 1 and 2 present the 
descriptives and the bivariate correlations of the variables used in the models.   
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 and 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Model Specification 
 One of the most commonly used growth models is the one proposed by Gibrat, which 
assumes size-independent growth (but see Barnett and Carroll, 1987; Barron, West & 
Hannan, 1995). Following previous studies (e.g. Sorensen, 1999; Greve, 2008), we model the 
firm growth rates as a function of a firm’s size and a number of covariates: 
      
   
    
      (           ) 
where S is firm size, α is an adjustment parameter indicating the dependence of growth on 
size, and β is a vector of parameters characterizing the influence of organizational and 
environmental covariates.  
 By transforming the equation into its natural logarithm, we obtain the following log-
linear model which can be estimated using linear regression: 
  (      )     (   )               
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 We use least square dummy variable regression models which include a dummy 
variable for each firm to isolate unobserved differences across firms (see also Sorensen, 
1999; Greve, 2008). Similarly, we also added dummy variables at the county level to control 
the unobserved heterogeneity across communities. Since the test of the first hypothesis 
employs a time-constant covariate (i.e., the MU dummy), random effects estimates are 
reported.  
Results 
 Table 3 provides the results obtained when testing Hypothesis 1. Model 1 shows the 
random effects model which includes only control variables. The estimates obtained for the 
controls are as expected: the size of the previous year (Lagged Size) is a strong predictor of 
next year size. The estimate of the lagged size variable – very close to 1 – suggests the 
existence of a process of proportional growth in our context (i.e., growth independent from 
firm size). As processes of proportional growth are associated with skewed patterns in the 
distribution of firms’ size, we read this result as suggesting the existence of systematic and 
stable size differences across the firms included in our sample – i.e., a possible indication of 
durable resource partitioning. Population Density exhibits a positive and significant effect on 
growth rates, similar to that of Electricity usage. Surprisingly, lower Disposable income and 
higher Municipal debt lead to higher growth rates. The effects of MU Density and
 
MU 
Density
2
 fail to reach statistical significance. Model 2 shows that, on average, MUs grow less 
than the subsidiaries of NWUs. In Model 3 we find however support to H1: the larger the 
competitive release, the higher benefits of MUs compared to subsidiaries of NWUs. 
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 and 4 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
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 Our argument is that two sociologically relevant factors may contribute to modify the 
equilibrium in the size distribution of this industry: identity matching to local preferences and 
variations of identity claims across firms. A first test of the relevance of matching to local 
preferences is provided in Model 4 when county-specific dummy variables are added. In this 
model specification, the significant interaction between competitive release and MU dummy 
loses statistical significance. We interpret this result as suggesting that growth rates do not 
happen at random but they are driven by (unobserved) county specific characteristics that 
point to the existence of geographic heterogeneity in the growth rates of MUs. As the 
challenge to the equilibrium inherent to resource partitioning comes from the success of 
peripheral organizations, we focus the remaining analyses on the subsample of MUs and 
investigate the importance of firm-level endowments through a fixed effects specification that 
allows isolating unobserved and time-invariant differences among MUs. 
 Table 4 shows the estimates of the LSDV models for the growth rates of the MUs 
from 2001 to 2008. Model 2 tests Hypothesis 2 concerning the impact of intrinsic appeal (i.e., 
matching) on the growth rates of MUs. As expected, the two dimensions of MU identity (i.e., 
Localness and Greenness) exhibit a positive and significant effect on the growth rates of 
MUs. H2 therefore is strongly supported. Model 3, through the addition of the Engagement 
variable, tests H3. As expected, engagement activities that signal greater commitment to local 
communities exhibit a positive and significant effect on MU growth rates. Model 4 tests H4 
predicting that a higher engagement will reinforce the effects of intrinsic appeal on growth 
rates. Both interaction effects are positive and significant, strongly supporting H4. 
Interestingly, the positive and significant main effect of engagement now turns negative and 
significant. This finding indicates that at a hypothetical value of zero of intrinsic appeal, 
increasing engagement reduces organizational growth rates. Last, notice that the coefficient 
of lagged size is now pointing to a much faster growth pattern among small firms.  
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 The growth of peripheral firms represents a possible challenge to the size differences 
across organizational forms, but a more serious threat may also come from the increasing 
fragmentation of the market periphery – i.e., from the dilution of the perceived homogeneity 
of the market periphery. We explore this issue through the additional analyses reported in 
Table 5. While increasing localness and greenness on average appear to reward MUs, the size 
of a MU is determinant in driving the appropriation of such rewards: while size amplifies the 
positive effect of Greenness on the growth rates of MUs, the opposite holds true with respect 
to Localness. These findings suggest that resource partitioning is taking place differently in 
the two extremes of the size distribution of peripheral firms: while greenness rewards mid-
/big sized MUs, localness is primarily rewarding smaller MUs. Interestingly, the fact that 
localness constrains organizational growth resonates with the qualitative evidence collected. 
Local audiences who are strongly attached to their communities exhibit strong resistance 
against the expansion of their local MUs. Indeed, the ifm study (2006) shows that the MUs 
following an aggressive growth strategy by acquiring customers outside of the local 
community are perceived as “cold expansionists”. Local customers “cannot identify 
themselves with the new size of their MUs”. The potential changes necessary for growth 
might be perceived by local citizens as “too cold” or “too business like”. In this way, the 
expansion of MUs in may be at risk of losing its cozy and familial identity – see also Figure 
1. The ifm study identifies this as the “uprooting” problem and warns that expansion will be 
paid with considerable loss in the home territory due to “decreasing identification” of the 
local customers.   
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Validity Issues  
In this section, we address issues of construct and internal validity and carry out a 
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series of robustness checks and additional analysis. Concerns of construct validity may 
involve the Localness – whereas we consider the operationalization of Greenness more 
intuitive. The determinants of voter turnout have been extensively studied by political 
scientists. In this respect, the literature seems to converge on three types of explanations 
(Blais, 2006; but also see Geys, 2006): (1) institutions; (2) party systems and electoral 
outcomes and (3) socioeconomic environment. Therefore it is legitimate to question to which 
extent voter turnout at county level elections measures local attachment. An alternative 
measure was therefore employed to test the robustness of our results: differences in county 
level voter turnout between local and national level elections in each county. When 
considering that differences in turnout are driven by socioeconomic factors, the following 
factors are routinely mentioned (Geys, 2006; Henderson and McEwen, 2009): (1) social 
pressure to participate; (2) genuine attachment to the local communities. As there is no reason 
to believe that social pressure should be higher in the same county for different types of 
elections, any difference in turnout between local and national elections should thus capture 
local attachment (i.e., localness). Table 6 shows the results obtained for the same set of 
models when employing this alternative measure of localness. The estimates obtained by this 
procedure resemble those reported in Table 4.
6
  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Three further robustness checks were carried out. In Table 7 we report the test of H1 
using GEE models with exchangeable correlation structure. Table 8 shows the test of H2 to 
H4 applying a fixed-effect estimator (XTREG in Stata 12), and manually adding county 
                                                          
6
 It has been argued that firm growth rates decrease with age (Harrison, 2004). However, information of 
organizational age is missing for over 60 firms in our data. Adding age control would decrease the number of 
observations by over 500 and we thus decided to drop the age control here. Actually firm age does not seem to 
matter much since models controlling for firm age (available upon request) exhibit very similar results. We 
think this is due to the fact that the average organizational age is very high (>60 years). 
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dummies. The results obtained from both these procedure appear comparable to those of 
Table 3. It is worth pointing out that the R
2
 (within) increases significantly from Model 1 to 
Model 4 in Table 8 further suggesting the relevance of our variables in capturing the 
variations in the growth rates of peripheral firms. Our theoretical arguments imply that the 
hypothesized effects of H2 to H4 should apply primarily in the household customer segment 
rather than in the industrial and commercial customers segments. As the models reported in 
Table 9 indicate, the postulated effects appear either non-significant or much weaker when 
focusing on industrial and commercial segments.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7, 8 and 9 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
Last, additional qualitative evidence is used to address internal validity issues and, in 
particular, to rule out a series of alternative explanations. For example, customers may not 
prefer the identity of MUs, but rather the customized services they offer. However, data 
shows that around 70% of the household customers never had any direct contact with their 
electricity suppliers (BDEW household customer survey, 1999 to 2006). Thus, the feeling of 
good services is mainly psychological and rooted in the emotional attachment to MUs. 
Furthermore, Figure 2 clearly indicates that private utilities such as NWUs are perceived as 
exhibiting more “customer orientation” than MUs. The inertia in switching operators may 
well be an alternative explanation for vitality of MUs. The BDEW household customer 
surveys (1999 to 2006) however indicates that it is not the case. The proportion of customers 
who do not switch suppliers because “I have a close relationship with my current supplier, 
which I do not want to give up” has jumped from 35% in 1999 to around 80% in 2001 and 
remained relatively stable afterwards. In contrast, the proportion of customer fearing “high 
efforts involved in switching” and “risk of lower supply security” has been much lower at 
around 40%. Notice that the 1999-2001 period was the one in which several regional utilities 
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have perished and the identities of MUs and NWUs started to be increasingly perceived as 
oppositional.  
Discussion and Conclusions 
Drawing inspiration from the limitations of existing research on resource partitioning 
(Carroll, 1985; Carroll and Swaminathan, 2000) and by relying on recent developments in 
organization ecology (Hannan et al., 2007), we aimed at improving our understanding of the 
processes of identity-based partitioning by focusing on organizational growth rates. Our main 
goal was to explore the determinants and challenges to the organizational diversity generated 
by competitive release and, thus, by identity-based resource partitioning. To reach this goal, 
we employed qualitative and quantitative evidence and explored the growth rates of German 
electricity firms.  
We propose that besides freeing resource, competitive release resulting from the 
downfall of the near-center producers contributes to increase the contrast between the identity 
of center and peripheral organizations. Therefore, competitive release on average benefits 
more the organizational growth rates of peripheral organizations than those of the subsidiaries 
of the center organizations. However, the beneficial effect of competitive release is not 
uniform across peripheral organizations due to their heterogeneity in terms of identity claims 
and of matching to local preferences: peripheral producers that enjoyed a greater match 
between their identity and local preferences grew faster. We also found that those firms that 
made credible identity claims by participating in cooperative activities exhibited higher 
growth rates. In addition, engagement reinforced the benefits of intrinsic appeal with respect 
to firm growth rates. While increasing growth rates capture well the success of MUs, traces 
of fragmentation of the market periphery appear evident from some of our additional 
analyses.  
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Our model differs from the existing research on identity based resource partitioning in 
two ways. First, Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) focused on a market initially populated by a 
single producer segment, namely smaller generalists. Following the mass exit of smaller 
generalists defeated in the “war” based on economies of scale, larger generalists were unable 
and uninterested in covering the whole market. Resource demand at the periphery remained 
unsatisfied and specialists were founded to occupy these empty niches. Therefore, Carroll and 
Swaminathan’s (2000) argument hinges upon unsatisfied demand. Conversely, our model 
does not require unsatisfied demand. We started with a market populated by three sub-
segments and the exit of the middle segment increases identity salience of the peripheral form 
for the peripheral audience. As a consequence of the emergence of separate and oppositional 
identities, meaningful boundaries between center and peripheral forms get established. In this 
respect, our model extends the applicability of resource partitioning from one-segment 
market to multiple-segment market and relax the requirement of unsatisfied demand at 
periphery. Second, in the microbrewery study, a social movement among the new specialist 
breweries is necessary to “artificially” construct an oppositional identity, in order to cement 
the boundaries and achieve “durable resource partitioning” (Polos et al., 2010). In our model, 
oppositional identities between center and periphery arise more “automatically” as a result of 
the downfall of the near-center producers. Thus, according to our arguments, a social 
movement is not necessary to trigger identity based resource partitioning. Note that collective 
actions were initiated in our context, but they did not took the same form as the ones 
described by Carroll and Swaminathan (2000). 
Furthermore, our results add to the recent revision of resource partitioning theory 
(Polos et al., 2010). The theoretical model of Polos and colleagues focuses mainly on the 
audience side effect of competitive release, namely the matching part of our model. They 
argue that even in presence of competitive release, unless a separate and oppositional identity 
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is perceived by audience members, partitioning is not sustainable. This is because the center 
producers can expand their appeal by making use of their large budgets. Only when an 
oppositional schema of the peripheral form emerges, a durable partitioning arises. In case of 
two oppositional schemas, high grade of membership in one category precludes the 
possibility that the engagement in the oppositional category will generate actual appeal. We 
argue that competitive release does not only affect audience perception, but also producers’ 
actions, by stimulating cooperation activities. Interestingly, the actions oriented at 
consolidating the existence of an oppositional identity may also contribute to dilute it. For 
instance, the results reported in Table 5 suggest that, in our context, the market periphery is 
becoming increasingly fragmented. In general, while intrinsic appeal enhances organizational 
vitality, the growth of peripheral organizations may contribute to challenge their authenticity. 
Future research should investigate the tension between size and growth rates during 
partitioning processes and the effects of increased fragmentation of market peripheries. How 
much the individual success of peripheral organizations comes at the expenses of diluting 
their collective identity? As a durable resource partitioning implies a state of equilibrium that 
-- if rooted into size differences – it may be challenged by the growth of peripheral firms and 
by the increased fragmentation of market periphery.  
Last, the present paper contributes to research on organizational diversity driven by 
form identity as follows. First, to the best our knowledge, our paper represents the first 
empirical test of the mechanism of competitive release – and partly responds to the call of 
Hannan and colleagues’ (2007: 227) for innovative empirical tests of partitioning that depart 
from concentration. Second, our paper moves the locus of attention of partitioning studies 
from differences among producers (e.g., size, niche width) to the consideration of differences 
in relation to cognition and preferences of audience members. Indeed, the majority of 
research has treated resource partitioning as a rather uniform process across audience 
   
 
 31 
segments. Recent empirical efforts suggest that this might not be the case (Boone, Carroll & 
Van Witteloostujin, 2002; Greve, Pozner & Rao, 2006). In the present study we further 
contribute to this on-going discussion by mapping the heterogeneity of audience preferences 
along geographical communities (Hannan et al., 2007: 302-303). By studying audience 
heterogeneity through the lens of geography, we contribute also to the theoretical 
development on organizational identity by exploring the possible determinants of audience 
structure and heterogeneity (see Kocak, Hannan & Hsu 2010). Third, our study contributes to 
the general discussion on organizational diversity. For the cyclical processes of concentration 
and diversity to take place, the dominant firm’s ability to co-opt the peripheral organizations 
is crucial. For example, the process of re-concentration observed in the field of popular music 
industry from 1970 to 1973 resulted from the successful strategies of the majors such as 
Warner to buy independent companies (Peterson and Berger, 1975). Our study shows that 
until such boundary crossing is impeded by the existence of clear identity differences (i.e., 
clear “lines of demarcation”, as Durkheim (1893) put it), the manifestation of cyclical 
changes of diversity and homogeneity may be hindered.  
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FIGURE 1: 
The NWUs representing the confusing market (left side) and  
the “own municipal utilities” (right side) (Source: ifm 2006) 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. 
The oppositional images of MUs and private utilities (Source: TNS Emnid survey 2009) 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Size (log) 4278 10.55 1.42 2.94 16.60 
Lagged Size (log) 4277 10.55 1.41 2.94 16.60 
Competitive Release 7054 4.66 5.53 0.01 16.89 
MU 7056 0.97 0.16 0.00 1.00 
Localness 5873 0.57 0.08 0.32 0.81 
Greenness 6363 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.23 
Engagement  6468 1.83 1.10 1.00 4.00 
Year 7056 2002.50 3.45 1997.00 2008.00 
Population Age (log) 6445 3.74 0.04 3.61 3.89 
Population Density (log) 6412 5.54 0.96 3.66 8.35 
MU Density 6468 79.42 46.57 0.00 154.00 
MU Density
2
/1000 6468 8.48 8.32 0.00 23.72 
Disposable Income (log) 6226 9.71 0.14 9.29 10.16 
Municipal Debt (log) 6367 11.98 0.73 7.27 15.04 
Electricity Usage (log) 7056 18.38 1.89 12.09 19.01 
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TABLE 2 
Bivariate Correlations 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Size (log) 1.00 
              2. Lagged Size (log) 0.97 1.00 
             3. Competitive Release -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
            4. MU -0.40 -0.41 0.01 1.00 
           5. Localness -0.36 -0.36 0.09 0.10 1.00 
          6. Greenness 0.29 0.29 -0.08 -0.10 -0.20 1.00 
         7. Engagement  -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 0.13 0.16 0.06 1.00 
        8. Year 0.01 0.01 -0.67 -0.03 -0.14 0.09 0.08 1.00 
       9. Population Age (log) 0.09 0.09 -0.23 -0.03 -0.41 -0.27 -0.19 0.36 1.00 
      10. Population Density (log) 0.61 0.61 0.01 -0.15 -0.44 0.55 -0.08 -0.01 0.09 1.00 
     11. MU Density -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 0.00 0.58 0.15 0.23 0.01 -0.43 0.03 1.00 
    12. MU Density2/1000 -0.07 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.61 0.06 0.21 0.01 -0.36 -0.02 0.98 1.00 
   13. Disposable Income (log) 0.11 0.11 -0.20 -0.03 0.12 0.58 0.12 0.28 -0.25 0.36 0.47 0.38 1.00 
  14. Municipal Debt (log) 0.32 0.33 0.01 -0.15 -0.18 0.30 -0.13 -0.01 -0.06 0.37 -0.07 -0.12 0.17 1.00 
 15. Electricity Usage (log) 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.03 1.00 
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TABLE 3 
Random Effect Models of Growth Rates of NWUs and MUs, 2001-2008  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Base  H1 Add County 
Dummies 
     
Lagged Size (log) 0.90165*** 0.88731*** 0.88781*** 0.7881*** 
 (0.030) (0.034) (0.034) (0.060) 
Competitive Release  0.0059 -0.0046 -0.0034 
  (0.0016) (0.0033) (0.003) 
MU  -0.2969** -0.3288** -0.498*** 
  (0.136) (0.125) (0.193) 
Competitive ReleaseXMU   0.005* -0.004 
   (0.003) (0.003) 
Year 0.00212 -0.003 -0.003 -0.0169* 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) 
Population Age (log) -0.1562 -0.1652 -0.1600 -0.0231 
 (0.168) (0.1716) (0.1715) (0.8402) 
Population Density (log) 0.0913*** 0.0981*** 0.0980*** 0.0391 
 (0.0288) (0.030) (0.031) (0.208) 
MU Density -0.00013 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.011 
 (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0089) 
MU Density
2
/1000 0.0006 0.0002 0.0003 0.0446 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.031) 
Disposable Income (log) -0.14815** -0.1487** -0.1459** 0.9638** 
 (0.068) (0.070) (0.070) (0.335) 
Municipal Debt (log) 0.0242* 0.0209* 0.0209* 0.0491 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.046) 
Electricity Usage (log) 0.9569** 0.9330** 0.929** 0.916** 
 (0.464) (0.422) (0.422) (0.428) 
Constant -20.16061* -21.277 -21.111 9.766** 
 (10.541) (14.102) (14.088) (12.617) 
Observations 3,454 3,454 3,454 3,454 
R-squared 0.981 0.981 0.981 0.982 
df_m 9 11 11 154 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 4  
Least Square Dummy Variables Models of Growth Rates of the MUs, 2001-2008                 
(Size in Household Customer Segment) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Base H2 H3 H4 
     
Lagged Size 0.24327 0.39177*** 0.39149*** 0.38981*** 
 (0.164) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
Localness  1.37243** 1.35550** 0.36275 
  (0.574) (0.571) (0.614) 
Greenness  2.45761** 2.54843** 1.33080 
  (1.011) (1.023) (1.175) 
Engagement   0.01391** -0.30797** 
   (0.007) (0.131) 
LocalnessXEngagement    0.49582** 
    (0.222) 
GreennessXEngagement    0.66201** 
    (0.294) 
Competitive Release -0.00022 0.00060 0.00060 0.00067 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year -0.00225 0.00809 0.00642 0.00742 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Population Age (log) -1.63028* -1.77782* -1.68431 -1.88943* 
 (0.890) (1.038) (1.029) (1.108) 
Population Density (log) 0.04107 -0.30827 -0.30781 -0.35782 
 (0.236) (0.255) (0.254) (0.264) 
MU Density 0.03249** 0.04216** 0.04221** 0.04145** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
MU Density
2
/1000 -0.11377** -0.14869** -0.14902** -0.14718** 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) 
Disposable Income (log) 0.73298*** 0.46558* 0.47397* 0.49869* 
 (0.261) (0.270) (0.271) (0.275) 
Municipal Debt (log) 0.01400 -0.00333 -0.00455 -0.00210 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Electricity Usage (log) 0.86638** 0.27424 0.27318 0.27071 
 (0.357) (0.274) (0.274) (0.273) 
Constant -7.34757 -12.15790 -9.24609 -9.62736 
 (13.014) (12.873) (13.019) (13.167) 
Observations 3,388 3,224 3,224 3,224 
R-squared 0.955 0.962 0.962 0.962 
df_m 542 536 537 539 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 5 
Least Square Dummy Variable Models of Growth Rates of the MUs, 2001-2008 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES   
   
Lagged Size (log) 0.21904 0.02165 
 (0.310) (0.322) 
Localness 7.55307* 5.57602 
 (3.942) (3.757) 
Greenness -59.33442*** -46.90352*** 
 (22.068) (16.720) 
LocalnessXSize -0.59188* -0.41995 
 (0.358) (0.341) 
GreennessXSize 5.67084*** 4.52610*** 
 (2.039) (1.530) 
Engagement  -1.00913** 
  (0.421) 
EngagementXSize  0.09070** 
  (0.037) 
log_lag_weighted_proxi 0.00063 0.00091 
 (0.002) (0.001) 
Year -0.01795 -0.02357* 
 (0.013) (0.013) 
Population Age (log) 1.45653 2.21996 
 (1.420) (1.488) 
Population Density (log) 0.13563 0.21968 
 (0.243) (0.249) 
MU Density 0.03205** 0.03250** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
MU Density2/1000 -0.10826* -0.10969* 
 (0.059) (0.058) 
Disposable Income (log) 0.98461*** 0.92109*** 
 (0.303) (0.294) 
Municipal Debt (log) 0.00550 -0.00323 
 (0.033) (0.031) 
Electricity Usage (log) 0.29984 0.29242 
 (0.274) (0.269) 
Constant 19.56405 30.46590* 
 (16.591) (18.312) 
   
Observations 3,224 3,224 
R-squared 0.963 0.964 
df_m 538 540 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 6 
Additional Analysis 1. Least Square Dummy Variables Models of Growth Rates of the 
MUs, 2001-2008 (Using an Alternative Measure of Localness) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES log_SalesHC log_SalesHC log_SalesHC log_SalesHC 
     
Lagged Size (log) 0.24327 0.39340*** 0.39311*** 0.39308*** 
 (0.164) (0.150) (0.150) (0.150) 
Localness Alternative  0.86149** 0.84709** 0.23701 
  (0.351) (0.349) (0.454) 
Greenness  1.85631** 1.95634** 1.28063 
  (0.922) (0.932) (1.182) 
Engagement   0.01393** 0.06737 
   (0.007) (0.045) 
Localness AlternativeXEngagement    0.31726* 
    (0.175) 
GreennessXEngagement    0.28354 
    (0.292) 
Competitive Release -0.00022 0.00078 0.00078 0.00080 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year -0.00225 -0.00154 -0.00310 -0.00155 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Population Age (log) -1.63028* -1.47623 -1.38675 -1.51796 
 (0.890) (1.019) (1.012) (1.074) 
Population Density (log) 0.04107 -0.31410 -0.31263 -0.40002 
 (0.236) (0.255) (0.255) (0.273) 
MU Density 0.03249** 0.04138** 0.04145** 0.04045** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
MU Density
2
/1000 -0.11377** -0.14594** -0.14633** -0.14301** 
 (0.050) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Disposable Income (log) 0.73298*** 0.34736 0.35791 0.30208 
 (0.261) (0.262) (0.263) (0.263) 
Municipal Debt (log) 0.01400 -0.00529 -0.00648 -0.00686 
 (0.030) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Electricity Usage (log) 0.86638** 0.25054 0.25020 0.24030 
 (0.357) (0.275) (0.275) (0.276) 
Constant -7.34757 8.78305 11.42332 10.26317 
 (13.014) (14.545) (14.826) (14.854) 
     
Observations 3,388 3,224 3,224 3,224 
R-squared 0.955 0.961 0.961 0.962 
df_m 542 536 537 539 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 7 
Additional Analysis 2. GEE Models of Growth Rates of the NWUs and MUs, 2001-
2008 (Robustness Check for H1)  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Base  H1 
    
Lagged Size (log) 0.98286*** 0.97759*** 0.97756*** 
 (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) 
Competitive Release  0.00302 -0.00654 
  (0.002) (0.005) 
MU  0.00654 -0.08173* 
  (0.060) (0.043) 
Competitive ReleaseXMU   0.00976** 
   (0.005) 
Year 0.00014 -0.01381 -0.01375 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) 
Population Age (log) -0.13733* -0.22019* -0.22224* 
 (0.082) (0.118) (0.119) 
Population Density (log) 0.01928*** 0.02918*** 0.02929*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
MU Density -0.00013 -0.00097 -0.00098 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
MU Density
2
/1000 0.00050 0.00523 0.00528 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Disposable Income (log) -0.05466* -0.05145 -0.05143 
 (0.033) (0.040) (0.040) 
Municipal Debt (log) 0.00254 0.00495 0.00486 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Electricity Usage (log) 0.94991** 3.50986 3.51413 
 (0.458) (3.484) (3.482) 
Constant -17.14591* -37.39715 -37.50361 
 (9.900) (47.502) (47.472) 
Observations 3,454 2,605 2,605 
Number of firm 551 550 550 
chi2 142016 89267 127050 
df_m 9 11 12 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 8 
Additional Analysis 3. Fixed Effects Models of Growth Rates of the NWUs and MUs, 
2001-2008 (Robustness Check for H2 to H4)  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Base H2 H3 H4 
     
Lagged Size (log) 0.24327*** 0.39177** 0.39149** 0.38981** 
 (0.086) (0.157) (0.157) (0.156) 
Localness  1.37243* 1.35550* 0.36275 
  (0.797) (0.794) (0.502) 
Greenness  2.45761* 2.54843* 1.33080 
  (1.298) (1.311) (1.470) 
Engagement   0.01391** -0.30797** 
   (0.006) (0.154) 
LocalnessXEngagement    0.49582* 
    (0.267) 
GreennessXEngagement    0.66201** 
    (0.319) 
Competitive Release -0.00022 0.00060 0.00060 0.00067 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year -0.00225 0.00809 0.00642 0.00742 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Population Age (log) -1.63028* -1.77782* -1.68431* -1.88943* 
 (0.862) (0.975) (0.958) (1.054) 
Population Density (log) 0.04107 -0.30827 -0.30781 -0.35782 
 (0.236) (0.385) (0.384) (0.397) 
MU Density 0.03249** 0.04216** 0.04221** 0.04145** 
 (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
MU Density
2
/1000 -0.11377** -0.14869** -0.14902** -0.14718** 
 (0.053) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) 
Disposable Income (log) 0.73298*** 0.46558** 0.47397** 0.49869** 
 (0.268) (0.200) (0.202) (0.211) 
Municipal Debt (log) 0.01400 -0.00333 -0.00455 -0.00210 
 (0.032) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) 
Electricity Usage (log) 0.86638** 0.27424 0.27318 0.27071 
 (0.381) (0.267) (0.267) (0.266) 
Constant -7.05260 -14.30870 -11.37543 -11.88233 
 (11.089) (12.181) (12.046) (12.277) 
Observations 3,388 3,224 3,224 3,224 
Number of firm 551 550 550 550 
R-squared              0.075        0.170 0.171         0.172 
     
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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TABLE 9 
Additional Analysis 4. Least Square Dummy Variable Models of Growth Rates of the 
NWUs and MUs, 2001-2008 (Size in Industrial and Commercial Customer Segment) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES log_SalesHC log_SalesHC log_SalesHC log_SalesHC 
     
Lagged Size (log) 0.30652** 0.42571*** 0.42543*** 0.42453*** 
 (0.139) (0.117) (0.118) (0.117) 
Localness Alternative  1.06438 1.05442 0.10108 
  (0.655) (0.653) (0.733) 
Greenness  -3.08318** -3.02613** -2.02840 
  (1.263) (1.276) (1.789) 
Engagement   0.00861 -0.20768 
   (0.013) (0.161) 
Localness AlternativeXEngagement    0.46479* 
    (0.257) 
GreennessXEngagement    -0.38669 
    (0.577) 
Competitive Release 0.00175 0.00189 0.00189 0.00186 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Year 0.01013 0.01547 0.01442 0.01680 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Population Age (log) -2.10065* -1.67293 -1.61486 -2.19180* 
 (1.129) (1.189) (1.183) (1.257) 
Population Density (log) -0.34686 -0.53673 -0.53661 -0.55116 
 (0.293) (0.332) (0.332) (0.337) 
MU Density 0.01656 0.02022 0.02024 0.02134 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
MU Density
2
/1000 -0.07002 -0.08074 -0.08090 -0.08538 
 (0.055) (0.064) (0.064) (0.065) 
Disposable Income (log) -0.03628 0.01947 0.02491 0.11713 
 (0.358) (0.400) (0.400) (0.403) 
Municipal Debt (log) -0.01060 -0.01532 -0.01610 -0.01316 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) 
Electricity Usage (log) -1.28487*** -1.80455*** -1.80514*** -1.79625*** 
 (0.425) (0.344) (0.345) (0.344) 
Constant    (1.616) 
 19.37157 15.40636 17.23063 13.82393 
 (16.728) (17.190) (17.329) (17.535) 
Observations 3,342 3,187 3,187 3,187 
R-squared 0.953 0.959 0.959 0.959 
df_m 530 526 527 529 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
